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THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS AND
CORPORATE EVENT WAVES: PART I
MAY HU
MAY HU is a lecturer in finance within the Deakin Graduate School of Business at Deakin University, Australia. Prior to
embarking on her academic career, May worked in investment bank as a security price analyst and mergers and acquisitions
advisor. Empirical working experience broadens her research interests, especially in the areas of corporate finance and asset
pricing, such as mergers and acquisitions, dividend policy, IPOs, venture capital, behavioral finance, financial anomaly and
corporate governance. May’s research projects have been awarded a number of the best papers in various prestigious
international conferences in the U.S. and Australia. She currently teaches corporate finance in the postgraduate and MBA
programs.
 Part I of this article examines the arguments for and against the efficient market hypothesis.
Efficient markets are commonly defined as ones that do not allow investors to earn above-average returns without
accepting above-average risk. In a traditional framework, where investors are rational and there are no frictions, the EMH states
that a security’s price reflects its fundamental value, which is the sum of its discounted expected future cash flows. Put simply,
under the EMH, securities are “rightly priced.” In other words, under the EMH there is no free lunch, that is, no investment
strategy can earn abnormal returns. This is because financial markets arguably reflect all information available about individual
stocks. The economic principle underlying the EMH is the arbitrage theory. If there is a temporary mispricing in the market,
agents who constantly monitor the market will take opportunity of this mispricing by submitting arbitrage orders, which will
eventually cause the share prices to adjust back to their “fair value.” Hence, any information in the market is readily acted upon,
making return predictability short-lived and minimal.
There have, however, been many controversies surrounding the EMH. For the EMH to hold, there must be a number of
intelligent and rational agents who act on their assessments of trends and value in order to identify any mispricing in the market.
Paradoxically, if these agents were to believe in the EMH, they would not be active in the market constantly looking for
arbitrage opportunities. Hence, they must believe to a certain extent that they are capable of making abnormal returns. In recent
years, an increasing number of financial economists have come to question the EMH. Events such as the internet bubble of the
1990s or the stock market crash of 1987 have led many to believe that markets are not efficient. In addition, many researchers
have suggested that stock prices can be, at least partially, predicted by factors such as earnings yield, book-to-market ratio, and
dividend yield, to name a few. Advocates of market efficiency, however, argue that while valuation errors do occur,
information is always rapidly conveyed in financial markets. It is argued that even if there were arbitrage opportunities or
observable patterns in stock prices, it would be almost impossible for investors to exploit such opportunities, one apparent
evidence being the inability for experts or professional investors to “beat the market” and obtain above-average or excess
returns.
Through this study, I find that while the EMH has been widely accepted for decades among academics, practitioners and
regulators still appear to be unconvinced. From a behavioral perspective, I show that human psychology and sentiment factors
can account for some discrepancies in financial markets. I also find evidence of limited arbitrage being risky and costly and,
hence, impeding the ability of investors to take advantage of profitable opportunities. Event studies are also analyzed in order to
identify over- or underreaction in the stock market. Moreover, I find evidence of corporate event waves, with particular focus
on investor sentiment, also contradict the EMH.
This study provides an extensive analysis of the critical discussions surrounding the EMH and deepens and strengthens the
understanding of the EMH, as well as the arguments for and against. It also identifies areas that have not been explored before
and hence opens up gaps for future research. From a practical perspective, this article helps to situate the current work around
the EMH in the corporate finance field and hence provides a context to assist in investment decisions.
Market efficiency
The efficient market hypothesis. The EMH has long been accepted as one of the central theories of finance and
considered as the foundation of many studies of market reaction surrounding different corporate events. In his influential
survey article, Fama argues that security prices fully incorporate all existing information in an unbiased fashion. Fama’s
argument is that when information arises, the market reacts instantaneously and share prices fully absorb all information to
return to equilibrium without delay.1  The EMH assumes that all investors behave rationally and that market friction is
negligible or insignificant.2
The EMH is associated with the idea of a “random walk,” which, as commonly used in finance literature, describes price
series that differ subsequently to previous prices. This is based on the idea that if information is fully reflected in the stock
1 Fama, E.F., Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work, Journal of Finance 25, no. 2 (1970): 383–417.
2 Ibid.; Barberis, N. and Thaler, R., A survey of behavioural finance, Handbook of the Economics of Finance (2003).
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prices, then tomorrow’s price change will only reflect tomorrow’s news and will be independent of price change today.
However, since news is unpredictable, price changes should also be unpredictable and random.
In 1991, Fama further developed the EMH into three forms: weak, semi-strong, and strong.3  In the weak form, current
market prices fully reflect historical data such that future share prices cannot be predicted by examining past information. Since
share prices follow a random walk, price movements are not determined by historical information, but rather by new
information not contained in the price series. The semi-strong form states that security prices fully reflect both current and
historical information. Share prices only change with publicly available information, and any deviations from equilibrium
prices are usually eliminated very quickly. Therefore, investors cannot earn excess returns by using technical analysis or
fundamental analysis, especially in the long run. Downe et al., argue that the semi-strong form gives comfort to investors, in
that the market price is the best estimate of a stock’s fair value once information is available.4  Corrado supports Fama’s idea
that financial information cannot be utilized to discover under- or overpriced shares since share prices fully reveal all available
information instantaneously.5  Jensen and Ruback report that the semi-strong form of the EMH proposes that the occurrence of
specific events sends signals to the market, which then adjusts security prices.6  In the strong form of EMH, share prices fully
reflect all information, including historical, current, and insider information that is not available to the public. Excess return can
be earned even through insider trading. This, however, can be impeded by legal barriers to accessing private information.
By the start of the 1970s, tests of various asset pricing models and other empirical studies have uncovered anomalies in
market behaviors. These anomalies appear to show patterns that are not based on market information, contradicting the EMH.
They can be classified into three types:
1. fundamental, such as the size effect or the value effect;
2. technical, such as momentum and long-term return reversal; or
3. calendar, such as the Monday and January effect. 
Anomalies. Several researchers have looked at the cross section behavior of stock returns to variables such as firm size,
earnings yield, leverage, and book-to-market equity. Ball and Banz found that small firms have higher returns than larger firms,
even after adjusting for risk. This is commonly referred to as the “small firm effect.”7  Findings by Basu indicate that portfolios
with high earnings yield tend to have higher risk adjusted returns than portfolios with lower earnings yields.8  Stattman and
Rosenberg as well as Reid and Lanstein found that average returns on U.S. stocks are positively related to the ratio of a firm’s
book value of equity to its market value (BE/ME).9  Bhandari documents a positive relationship between leverage and average
returns.10  Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny examine the returns of value strategies for portfolios sorted by B/M (book-to-
market), C/P (cash flow-to-price), E/P (earning-to-price), and past sales growth. They identify high (low) C/P stocks with value
(growth) stocks because their growth rate of cash flow is expected to be low (high) and they find high C/P stocks to generate
higher returns than low C/P stocks.11  They also found higher E/P and B/M stocks to generate higher returns and higher GS
(growth rate of sales) stocks to earn lower returns.
Jegadeesh and Titman found that stocks with a strong performance continue to outperform stocks with a poor past
performance in the next period with an average excess return of about 1 percent per month.12  On the other hand, DeBondt and
3 Fama, E.F., Efficient capital market II, Journal of Finance 46, no. 5 (1991): 1575–1617.
4 Downe, E.A., O’Connor, M., Shapiro, S., and Reid, S., Can long-term historical data help investors time the market?, American Business Review 22, no.
2 (2004): 108–116.
5 Corrado, C., Risk and uncertainty in efficient capital markets or why is the Nasdaq so risky?, University of Auckland Business Review (2001): 12–18.
6 Jensen, M. and Ruback, R., The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence, Journal of Financial Economics 11 (1983): 5–50.
7 Ball, R., Anomalies in relationships between securities’ yields and yield surrogates, Journal of Financial Economics 6 (1978): 103–126; Banz, R.W.,
The relationship between return and market value of common stocks, Journal of Financial Economics 9 (1981): 3–18.
8 Basu, S., Investment performance of common stocks in relation to their price-earnings ratios: A test of the efficient market hypothesis, Journal of
Finance 32, no. 3 (1977): 663–682; Basu, S., The relationship between earnings’ yiled, market value and return for NYSE common stocks: Further evidence,
Journal of Accounting and Economics 12 (1983): 129–156.
9 Stattman, D., Book values and expected stock returns, University of Chicago (1980) (unpublished paper); Rosenberg, B., Reid, K., and Lanstein, R.,
Persuasive evidence of market inefficiency, Journal of Portfolio Management 11, no. 3 (1985): 9–16.
10 Bhandari, L.C., Debt/equity ratio and expected common stock returns: Empirical evidence, Journal of Finance 43, no. 2 (1998): 507–528.
11 Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., and Robert W.V., Contrarian investment, extrapolation, and risk, Journal of Finance 49 (1994): 1541–1578.
12  Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S., Returns to buying winners and selling losers: Implications for stock market efficiency, Journal of Finance 48, no.1
(1993): 65–91; Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S., Profitability of momentum strategies: An evaluation of alternative explanations, University of Texas, Austin
(1999) (unpublished paper).
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Thaler show that portfolios of past “losers” are found to outperform past “winners,” and vice versa.13  For instance, they find
that losing stocks earn about 25 percent more than winning stocks, 36 months after portfolio formation. They argue that long-
term return reversal occurs mainly because of investors overemphasising past performance of companies. They also find
intermediate-term price momentum and long-run underperformance of initial public offerings (IPOs).
The most common calendar anomaly is the January effect, whereby stock returns tend to be higher in the month of January.
A widely accepted explanation for this is that investors tend to sell a large amount of securities in December in order to reduce
tax liabilities. Securities are then repurchased in early January at a cheaper price. The January effect has been observed mainly
in small cap stocks. Another cyclical anomaly in stock returns is the Monday effect, whereby stock prices are higher on
Mondays as compared to other days of the week. These empirical results contradict the EMH.
Fama argues that anomalies presented are not significant evidence against the EMH, and that the concept of market
efficiency should not be abandoned. He reports that anomalies are “chance results” that can be eliminated when methodology,
sample data, or measurement of market returns change.14  The perceptible underreaction of stock prices to information is about
as common as overreaction, and the evidence of post event continuation of pre-event abnormal returns is of similar frequency to
post-event reversal. If anomalies happen randomly between over- and underreaction, they are actually consistent with the
EMH.15  Similarly, Langdon is of the opinion that the debate around EMH is unnecessary.16  He suggests that the market
mechanism is efficient, but sometimes prices deviate from the equilibrium because the market is a dynamic and unstable
system. Dynamic systems can result in noise, oscillations, and vibration. However, the divergent share prices will return back to
equilibrium very quickly. Langdon develops a model for the security price behavior and acknowledges it as “almost efficient
market hypothesis” (AEMH). He finds that the greater the derivation from fundamental prices, the greater demand and supply
movements would be to move share prices back to equilibrium. This is why sometimes price-reversals happen. He argues that
although there are anomalies from time to time, they will gradually and eventually disappear and the market will become more
efficient.
Behavioral finance
In recent years, behavioral finance or, as put in the words of Thaler, “open-minded finance,” has become a prominent branch of
study of financial markets among many financial economists.17  It argues that investors are not fully rational and can be affected
by psychological emotions and cognitive biases when they make decisions. Thus, behavioral finance attempts to incorporate
human factors into financial models when analyzing market reaction to price changes.18  The two main concepts of behavioral
finance are limited arbitrage and psychological behavior.
Limited arbitrage. The EMH hypothesis is based on two assertions. First, as soon as there is a mispricing, arbitrage
opportunities are created, and rational investors will immediately snap up this opportunity in order to correct the mispricing.
While behavioral finance agrees with the assumption that any existing arbitrage opportunities will be appealing to investors, it
is not always the case that these are exploited. It argues that strategies designed to correct mispricing are often risky and costly,
creating limits to arbitrage. As a result, share prices diverging from their fundamental value may not be able to return to
equilibrium.19  Limited arbitrage occurs when there are constraints on opportunities due to fundamental risk, noise traders, and
implementation costs. Fundamental risk states that it is difficult to find perfect substitutes for securities in the market when
there is a mispriced situation. Substitutes are often highly imperfect. Therefore, it is impossible to eliminate the fundamental
risk in order to move prices back to equilibrium.20  Noise trader risk, an idea firstly articulated by De Long et al., and studied
further by Shleifer and Vishny, is the risk that mispricing worsens in the short run.21  That is, that the pessimistic investors
causing the securities prices to be undervalued in the first place become even more pessimistic in the future, hence lowering
13 Debontd, W.F.M. and Thaler, R.H., Does the stock market overreact?, Journal of Finance 40 (1985): 793–805.
14 Fama, E.F., Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioural finance, Journal of Financial Economics 49 (1998): 283–306.
15 Ibid.
16 Langdon, B.W., The Oscillation of systems: The missing link between price volatility and market efficiency, Journal of Finance 45, no. 4 (1989): 7–
11.
17 Thaler, R., Advances in Behavioural Finance (New York: Russell Sage, 1993).
18 Barber, B.M. and Odean, T., The courage of misguided convictions, Financial Analysts Journal 55, no. 6 (1999): 41–55.
19 Barberis, N. and Thaler, R., “A Survey of Behavioural Finance,” Handbook of the Economics of Finance. Constantinides et al. (Eds.), (Elseveir Science
B.V., 2003), 1051–1121.
20 Ibid.
21 De Long, J.B., Shleifer, A., Summers, L., and Waldmann, R., Noise trader risk in financial markets, Journal of Political Economy 98 (1990): 703–738;
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., The limits of arbitrage, Journal of Finance 52, no. 1 (1997): 35–55.
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prices even further, creating potential losses. In addition, implementation costs such as transaction costs associated with
commissions and bid-ask spreads can make arbitrage less attractive, and arbitrageurs may not be able to gain positive profits
after considering the costs.22  Thus, in contrast to the costless and riskless arbitrage discussed in many finance textbooks, real
world arbitrage entails both costs and risk, which creates barriers to arbitrage opportunities and may allow deviations from
fundamental value to persist.
Psychological behavior. Behavioral finance also considers human psychology and sentiment factors in the market to
explain discrepancies in share prices. For instance, books like Beyond Greed and Fear: Understanding Behavioural Finance
and the Psychology of Investing, and Inefficient Market are famous in the behavioral finance field.23  Investors like to feel good
about themselves, try to avoid regret, and seek pride when making decisions.24  They have a tendency to sell winners too soon
and hold losers too long. Some investors become overly optimistic about recent gains and, conversely, overly pessimistic about
recent losses.25  This is known as the disposition effect. Attachment bias makes investors emotionally attached to security. As a
result, they tend to ignore bad news and end up holding the stock for too long.26  Investors can be overconfident, especially in
knowledge and control; this is referred to as the “illusion of control” in psychology finance. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and
Subrahmanyam report most of the common factors that underlay investor behavior for market under- and overreactions to occur
are overconfidence and biased self-attribution. Even moods can temporarily influence a decision.27  For example, investors
make more optimistic judgements when they are in a good mood.28  Although behavioral finance relaxes the EMH assumption
that investors have consistent beliefs and adds human factors into asset pricing model, it is reliant on the EMH theory. Without
the EMH, behavioral finance theories could not be advanced.
Incomplete revelation hypothesis
An alternative theory to the EMH and behavioral finance is the incomplete revelation hypothesis (IRH) developed by
Bloomfield.29  The IRH states that statistical data about share prices are sometimes costly and not readily observable by the
public and hence less revealed in market prices. Managers, for instance, will attempt to hide bad news in financial reports in
order to boost stock prices and, as a result, investors will devote time and resources to identify information that is hard to extract
from financial statements and not reflected in market prices. Because of this, the IRH is inconsistent with the EMH. The IRH
uses insights about rational expectations to illustrate the relationship between the demand for costly information and the degree
of market inefficiency. It argues that investors trade rationally and interpret the market well but are unable to obtain adequate
data with agents reacting differently with different information.30  The high cost of information could be attributable to either
regulation or managers’ attempts to display good data and hide bad news in footnotes. There is a balance between the costs of
acquiring such information and the benefits this can give to the informed participant. The increased costs are only acceptable to
some traders in the market.31
The IRH accommodates both perspectives of EMH and behavioral finance. It stresses on the fact that the lack of apparent
inefficiency does not indicate irrational decisions by investors. It is founded on the fact that investors or market participants
make rational decisions based on the available information. Some accounting numbers or relationships, however, are more
costly or difficult to uncover. Hence, not all participants have access to the same information and thus make different decisions.
An important distinction between behavioral finance and the IRH is that behavioral finance argues that market participants
react inefficiently to public information while the IRH assumes that investors are rational but that information is not always
readily available to every investor. For instance, behavioral finance suggests that, while information is publicly and fully
reflected in share prices, certain psychological factors or forces induce managers or investors to make decisions that are not
22 Op. cit. note 19.
23 Shefrin, H., Beyond Greed and Fear: Understanding Behavioural Finance and the psychology of investing Boston. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Business School Press, 2000); Shleifer, A., Inefficient Markets. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
24 Shefrin, H. and Statman, M., The disposition to sell winners too early and ride losers too long: Theory and evidence, Journal of Finance 40, no. 3
(1985): 777–790.
25 Op. cit. note 13.
26 Baker, K.H. and Nofsinger, J.R., Psychological biases of investors, Financial Services Review 11 (2002): 97–116.
27 Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., and Subrahmanyam, A., Investors psychology and security market under-and overreactions, Journal of Finance 53 (1998):
1839–1885.
28 Op. cit. note 26.
29  Bloomfield, R.J., The “incomplete revelation hypothesis” and financial reporting, Accounting Horizons 16, no. 3 (2002): 233–243.
30 Sandroni, A., Efficient markets and Bayes’ rule, Economic Theory 26 (2005): 741–764.
31 Op. cit. note 29.
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necessarily optimal, and these consequently affect market behavior. The IRH, on the other hand, states that investors are
rational but inadequate information prevents them from exploiting opportunities or that investors suffer from cognitive bias,
forming beliefs when they do not have adequate information.32  Brav and Heaton as well as Brandt, Zeng, and Zhang report that
there are similar predictive powers arising from theories based on cognitive bias and ones based on incomplete information.33
The IRH actually extends EMH with recognizing the cost of data, but it renovates many phenomena of anomalies into the
perspective of IRH predictions. Without EMH predicting what normal returns would be, it would be impossible to assess
whether or not a market is inefficient.
Event studies
With the ongoing debate over the levels of market efficiency, event studies have become increasingly popular in testing and
analyzing anomalies. They were introduced by Fama et al., to examine returns on stock prices in response to information about
an economic event or news.34  Since 1980, event studies have become more popular and frequently applied in finance studies.35
Fama used event studies to test for the semi-strong form of EMH.36  If there is a reaction at all, the purpose of the test being to
identify whether financial markets react positively or negatively to information discovered. If actual stock returns are to differ
from predicted results, then there is evidence that event studies affect security prices and influence investor reaction. If these
anomalies drift in the long run, the market can be identified as inefficient.37  According to Lo and Mckinley, event studies are
the most successful applications in the area of corporate finance.38
Event studies can be grouped according to non-self-selected events and self-selected events. Non-self-selected events are
exogenous events that occur outside the control of companies, such as a regulation or law change, a financial crisis, terrorism,
or a natural disaster. The event day would be the same for all firms and would generally affect all the firms at the same time.39
Self-selected events are where companies manage an event for a certain purpose. The event day usually varies depending on
each firm. Once the event day is identified, the effects on the asset prices can be tested compared with the “normal” change in
stock prices. Examples of self-selected corporate events are mergers and acquisitions, earnings announcements, new debt or
equity offerings, share repurchases, stock splits, and dividend announcements.
In the existing literature, stock price under- and overreaction have been observed in these self-selected events. Ikenberry,
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen examine long-run firm performance following open market share repurchase announcements
between 1980 and 1990.40  They find that shareholders earn significant positive abnormal returns after share buyback
announcements. Masulis, Vermaelen, and Dann argue that share repurchases signal favorable information about the future
performance of firms.41  Similar to earnings announcements, Ball and Brown report evidence that stock prices respond
positively to good earnings news.42  Bernard and Thomas support this idea and show a positive price drift for about a year after
32 Zeira, J., Information overshooting, booms, and crashes, Journal of Monetary Economics 43 (1999): 237–257; Lewellen, J. and Shanken, J., Learning,
asset-pricing tests, and market efficiency, Journal of Finance 57 (2002): 1113–1145; Hansen, L., Sargent, T., and Wang, N., Robust permanent income and
pricing with filtering. (Mimeo: University of Chicago, 2004); Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R., A model of investor sentiment, Journal of Financial
Economics 49 (1998): 307–343; Op. cit. note 27; Daniel, K., Hirshleifer, D., and Subrahmanyam, A., Overconfidence, arbitrage, and equilibrium asset pricing,
Journal of Finance 59 (2001): 921–965; Hong, H. and Stein, J., A unified theory of underreaction, momentum trading, and overreaction in asset markets,
Journal of Finance 54 (1999): 2143–2184; Odean, T., Are investors reluctant to realize their losses?, Journal of Finance 53, no. 5 (1998): 1775–1798; Odean,
T., Volume, volatility, price, and profit when all traders are above average, Journal of Finance 53 (2002): 1887–1934.
33 Brav, A. and Heaton, J., Competing theories of financial anomalies, Review of Financial Studies 15 (2002): 575–606; Brandt, M., Zeng, Q., and
Zhang, L., Equilibrium stock return dynamics under alternative rules of learning about hidden states, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 28, no. 10
(2004): 1925–1954.
34 Fama, E.F., Fisher, L., Jensen, M., and Roll, R., The adjustment of stock prices to new information, International Economic Review 10, no. 1 (1969):
1–21.
35 Wells, W.H., A Beginner’s guide to Event Studies, Journal of Insurance Regulation 22, no. 4 (2004): 61–70.
36 Op. cit. note 3.
37 Op. cit. note 35.
38 Lo, A.W. and McKinley, A.C., Event-study analysis, Book of Financial Economics (2004).
39 Ibid.
40  Ikenberry, D., Lakonishok, J., and Vermaelen, T., Market underreaction to open market share repurchases, Journal of Business 39 (1995): 181–208.
41 Masulis, R.W., Stock repurchases by tender offer: an analysis of the causes of common stock price changes, Journal of Finance 35 (1980): 305–319;
Vermaelen, T., Common stock repurchases and market signalling: An empirical study, Journal of Financial Economics 9 (1981): 139–183; Vermaelen, T.,
Repurchase tender offers, signalling, and managerial incentives, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 19 (1984): 163–182; Dann, L.Y., Common
stock repurchases: An analysis of returns to bondholders and stockholders, Journal of Financial Economics 9 (1985): 113–138.
42  Ball, R. and Brown, P., An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers, Journal of Accounting Research 6, no. 2 (1968): 159–178.
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the earnings announcements.43  Ramnath also argues that both investors and analysts seem to underreact to earning announce-
ments from other companies in the same industry.44  In addition, Stehle, Ehrhardt, and Przyborowsky reinforce the earlier
studies of Ritter and Loughran and Ritter on the examinations of initial public offerings (IPOs) and observe positive long-run
abnormal returns for three years following IPOs.45  He reports that IPOs occur more frequently in small- or medium-sized firms,
whereas seasonal equity offerings typically occur in large- and medium-sized companies. Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice as well
as Desai and Jain find that firms splitting shares experience positive abnormal returns before and after the announcements.46
They suggest that stock splits are signals of positive information, which attributes the post-splits returns to market
underreaction.
On the other hand, Loughran and Ritter report that companies conducting a seasoned equity offering tend to have poor
long-run investments for investors.47  Investors receive average returns of only 5 percent per year following an IPO and 7
percent per year following a seasoned equity offering, which is below the average returns of non-issuing firms over a five-year
horizon. Similarly, Asquith as well as Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker find negative long-term abnormal returns for acquiring
firms following mergers and acquisitions.48  Mitchell and Stafford attribute the negative return to market overreaction following
a strong performance of acquiring firms in advance of mergers and acquisitions.49  Furthermore, Michaely, Thaler, and
Womack report that there is an underreaction to the positive information in dividend initiation announcements but an
overreaction to the negative information in dividend omission announcements.50  The market under- and overreactions reported
in the various studies seem to challenge the EMH. However, Fama, Boehme and Sorescu, and Byun and Rozeff argue that long-
run abnormal returns are subject to the long-term event study methodologies applied.51  The long-run drifts disappear when the
conventional model of buy and hold abnormal returns is replaced by an unbiased model of calendar time portfolio abnormal
returns.
 This ends the first part of this article. The second part will appear in the May–June issue of Corporate Finance Review and
will go on to discuss corporate event waves before summing up the issues involved.
43 Bernard, V.L. and Thomas, J., Evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect the implications of current earnings for future earnings for future earnings,
Journal of Accounting and Economics 13, no. 4 (1990): 305–340.
44 Ramnath, S., Investor and analyst reactions to earnings announcements of related firms: an empirical analysis, Journal of Accounting Research 40, no.
5 (2002): 1351–1376.
45 Stehle, R., Ehrhardt, O., and Przyborowsky, R., Long-run stock performance of German initial public offerings and seasoned equity issues, European
Financial Management 6, no. 2 (2000): 173–196; Ritter, J.R., The long-term performance of initial public offerings, Journal of Finance 46 (1991): 3–27;
Loughran, T. and Ritter, J., The new issue puzzle, Journal of Finance 50 (1995): 23–51.
46  Ikenberry, D., Rankine, G., and Stice, E., What do stock splits really signal?, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 31 (1996): 357–375;
Desai, H. and Jain, P.C., Long-run common stock returns following splits and reverse splits, Journal of Business 70 (1997): 409–433.
47 Op. cit. note 45 Loughran.
48 Asquith, P., Merger bids, uncertainty and stockholder returns, Journal of Financial Economics 11 (1983): 51–83; Agrawal, A., Jaffe, J.F., and
Mandelker, G.N., The post-merger performance of acquiring firms in acquisitions: A re-examination of an anomaly, Journal of Finance 47 (1992): 1605–
1621.
49 Mitchell, M.L. and Stafford, E., Managerial decisions and long-term stock price performance, The Journal of Business 73, no. 3 (2000): 287–329.
50 Michaely, R., Richard, H., Thaler, R., and Kent, L.W., Price reactions to dividend initiations and omissions, Journal of Finance 50 (1995): 573–608.
51 Op. cit. note 14; Boehme, R.D. and Sorescu, S.M., The long-run performance following dividend initiations and resumptions: Underreaction or
Produce of Chance?, Journal of Finance 57, no. 2 (2002): 871–900; Byun, J. and Rozeff, M.S., Long-run performance after stock splits: 1927–1996, Journal
of Finance 58, no. 3 (2003): 1063–1086.
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